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Abstract 
This paper examines the intraday behavior of market liquidity in an order-driven market. Along with 
previous studies, we show that the U-shaped intraday pattern of spread does not depend on the market 
architecture. We also find that bid-ask spread and market depth are two dimensions of market liquidity. 
Market liquidity is inversely related to price volatility. We also investigate the impacts of trading volume 
on market liquidity. High trading volume implies high liquidity trades and as a result, limit order traders 
decrease (increase) ask (bid) price and/or increase depth at each quote. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Limit orders play a very important role in providing liquidity to the world stock 
exchanges of various market architectures. In an order-driven market, such as the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSE), the Paris Bourse, or the Tokyo Stock Exchange, limit orders 
provide all liquidity to the market. In a specialist market, such as the New York Stock 
Exchange, a large amount of liquidity comes from limit orders1. In a dealership market, 
such as NASDAQ, some types of limit order trading have been used recently2. This paper 
examines the impacts of price volatility, trading activity, and trading volume on the 
liquidity in an order-driven market where limit orders play a vital role in liquidity 
provision. 
                                                 
1 Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) report that limit orders account for 54 percent of all order submitted through 
SuperDot. Ross, Shapiro and Smith (1996) document that limit orders account for 65 percent of all 
executed orders and 75 percent of executed shares in SuperDot system. 
2 Market makers in NASDAQ are required to display limit orders. 
 In a pure order-driven market, investors can submit limit orders or market orders. Limit 
orders are kept in a limit order book waiting for execution. If a trade takes place, a limit 
order is executed at a better price than a market order. However, there are risks associated 
with it. First, a limit order might not be executed. Second, as limit order prices are fixed, 
there is an adverse selection risk due to the arrival of informed traders. Market orders, on 
the other hand, are executed with certainty at the bid and ask prices established through 
previously placed limit orders. However, the execution price may not be favorable. 
  
Glosten (1994) examines an equilibrium model in which there are 2 types of traders. The 
patient traders place limit orders and therefore supply liquidity to the market. The urgent 
traders, on the other hand, place market orders and consume liquidity. Informed traders 
are more likely to be urgent than patient because they want to exploit their super 
information3. Glosten shows that patient traders would not place limit orders unless the 
expected gains from trading with liquidity traders exceeded the expected loss from 
trading with informed traders. However, his model does not endogenize the traders' 
choice between market and limit orders. Handa and Schwartz (1996) extend Glosten's 
analysis by examining the investors' rational choice between market and limit orders. The 
choice depends on the investor's beliefs about the probability of his orders being executed 
against an informed or a liquidity trader. Handa and Schwartz show that in an order-
driven market, if the price is very volatile investors submit more limit orders than market 
orders because the expected gains from providing liquidity to the market exceed the 
potential loss from trading with informed traders. Foucault (1999) shows that the price 
volatility is the main determinant of the mix between market and limit orders. Indeed, if 
asset price is very volatile, the probability of trading against informed investors and the 
expected loss to them are larger. Limit order traders have to post higher ask price and 
lower bid price. This establishes a direct relationship between bid-ask spread and price 
volatility. Moreover, when price is volatile, market orders become less attractive than 
limit orders; as a result, more limit orders than market orders are placed. 
                                                 
3 One of the reasons is the value of private information depreciates over time. 
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 According to Harris (1990) liquidity is the willingness of some traders to take the 
opposite side of a trade that is initiated by someone at low cost. Thus, market liquidity 
has 2 dimensions: the price dimension, represented by spread, and the quantity 
dimension, represented by market depth. On the TSE, a complete quote comprises the bid 
price, the ask price and the depth which is the number of shares available at each price. If 
liquidity providers believe that there is an increase in the probability of informed trades in 
the market, they may respond by widening bid-ask spread and/or by quoting less depth at 
each price. This implies a negative relationship between spread and depth. 
  
On the empirical side, Kavajecz (1999) compares the limit order book spread with the 
quoted spread of specialists. He finds that specialists play a vital role in narrowing the 
bid-ask spread, especially for less frequently traded stocks. Chung et al (1999) examine 
the roles of limit order traders and specialists in NYSE and find that the U-shaped intra-
day pattern of spreads mostly reflects the intra-day behavior of spreads established by 
limit order traders. Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) show that in the NYSE wide spreads 
are accompanied by low depths and the liquidity falls in response to high volume and 
anticipation of earnings announcements. 
  
In this paper, we examine the empirical relation between bid-ask spreads and quoted 
depths, and the relations among market liquidity, trading activity, price volatility, and 
trading volume on the TSE, an order-driven market, where all liquidity is provided by 
limit order traders. We find that there is an inverse relationship between spread and 
depth. Thus, as in a specialist market, limit order traders in an order driven market use 
both dimensions of market liquidity to protect themselves from informed traders. We also 
show that the liquidity is directly related to the volume of trade. Our finding is 
inconsistent with the prediction of Easley and O'Hara (1992) who show that specialists 
use trading volume to infer the presence of informed traders. Thus, high volume should 
be accompanied by wide spread and low depth. However, our finding is consistent with 
the alternative hypothesis, suggested by Harris and Raviv (1993), that because of the 
differences of opinion among investors, high volume may mainly reflect high liquidity 
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 trades and therefore the market is more liquid. In other words, there might be a positive 
relationship between market liquidity and trading volume. 
  
In addition, we show that market liquidity is inversely related to price volatility. This 
finding is consistent with the prediction of Handa and Schwartz (1996). We also find that 
the trading activity which is represented by the number of transactions is negatively 
related to market liquidity. Harris (1987) shows that the number of trades could have an 
inverse relationship with price volatility if it reflects the rate of information flow. This 
can be extended to liquidity. However, Madhavan (1992) suggests that given trading 
volumes, the number of trades may be positively related to liquidity. 
  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the market and the dataset. Section 3 
examines the intraday pattern of depth, spread and volume of TSE stocks. Section 4 
presents the empirical relations among spread, depth, volume, price volatility, and trading 
activity. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKET AND THE DATASET 
  
The TSE has become a pure order-driven market since 1997 when it closed its trading 
floor. Bid and ask prices are determined by limit buy and sell orders in the absence of 
specialists. Limit order traders submit their orders to the electronic open book system, 
which is known as the Computer Assisted Trading System (CATS), through brokers. 
Limit orders are kept in the system and are executed using strict price and time priority. 
Trading is conducted on weekdays, Monday to Friday, excluding public holidays. Each 
trading day commences at 9:30 and ends at 16:00. 
  
Information on the five best bid and ask prices and the corresponding depths is 
disseminated to the public on the real time basis. Large order traders have the option of 
not disclosing the part of the order which exceeds 5,000 shares. However, traders might 
want to make public their orders since the TSE gives priority to disclosed orders over 
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 undisclosed orders at the same price4. For each transaction, the identity of the buyer and 
the seller is also known to the public. The TSE is as transparent as the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and the Paris Bourse but more transparent than the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
where only the member of the lead offices can observe orders. This is probably because 
there is no consensus about the relation between transparency and liquidity. 
  
The dataset is obtained from the Intraday Equity Trades and Quotes Record of the 
Toronto Stock Exchange. For each transaction, the dataset reports the execution time to 
the nearest second, the price and the quantity exchanged. For each quote, it reports the 
posting time, the best bid and ask prices and the quantity demanded or offered at those 
prices. 
  
In order to have enough observations necessary for intraday time series analysis, we 
focus on 31 most actively traded component stocks in the TSE 35 Index between 
September 1, 1999 and November 1, 1999. The list of those stocks is given in the 
appendix. Although it is the best available database for the current analysis, the dataset 
still has some limitations. In particular, we do not have order placement other than the 
best buying or selling limit orders. Therefore, the findings in this chapter need to be 
interpreted with some caution. 
  
3. INTRADAY PATTERNS OF LIQUIDITY AND VOLUME OF TSE STOCKS 
  
3.1. The Microstructure Models for Intraday Variations in Liquidity 
  
Several theoretical microstructure models attempt to explain the intraday variation of the 
bid-ask spread. In the inventory models5, the spreads exist in order to compensate the 
specialists for the risk of holding undesired inventory. Specifically, the specialist adjusts 
                                                 
4This description of the TSE is drawn from Jiang and Kryzanowski (1998).  
5 See Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980) (1982), Ho and Stoll (1981). 
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 bid and ask prices to go back to the optimal inventory position if the order imbalance 
moves him out of the desired position. 
  
In the specialist market power models, Brock and Kleidon (1992) show that demand for 
transactions is less elastic and higher at the opening and closing than at the rest of the 
day. There are at least two reasons. First, the accumulation of overnight information may 
change investors' optimal portfolio. Second, at the closing, due to the imminent non-
trading period, optimal portfolios can be different from the ones during the continuous 
trading periods. The specialist, therefore, can charge higher transaction price at those 
periods. This explains wide spreads at the opening and the closing of the trading day. 
This result can be extended to a pure order-driven market. 
  
Information models6 look at the adverse selection problem faced by the specialist who is 
at an informational disadvantage relative to informed traders. Therefore, the specialist 
must keep spreads wide enough so that the profits from trading with liquidity traders 
sufficiently compensate for the losses from trading with informed traders. In the model of 
Madhavan (1992), information asymmetry is gradually resolved during the trading day; 
therefore, spreads decline throughout the day. 
  
While numerous studies have examined the intraday variations in bid-ask spreads during 
the last two decades or so, only recently have researchers begun to study the behavior and 
the determinants of quoted depths. Ye (1995) analyzes the optimal strategy of specialists 
and shows that when the probability of informed trades rises, specialists widen spreads 
and reduce depth at each quote. He also finds that specialists decrease depths in response 
to an increase in price volatility. Kavajecz (1999) shows that depths are used by 
specialists as a strategic variable to reduce risk associated with information events. 
  
                                                 
6 See Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Easley and O'Hara (1987), 
Madhavan (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1994). 
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 A market maker in a specialist market and limit order traders in a pure order driven 
market supply liquidity and immediacy to the market. However, while the ultimate goal 
of the market maker is to provide an orderly and smooth market by continuously posting 
bid and ask quotes, limit order traders have much more freedom in their quotes. Intraday 
pattern of spreads and depths in a specialist market is the result of successive decisions 
by a single market maker while that in a pure order driven market is determined by many 
limit order traders. Nevertheless, due to the competition among limit order traders, we 
would expect that the pattern is the same in both market architectures. 
 
3.2. Intraday Variation in Bid-Ask Spreads, Volumes, and Depths 
  
In this section, we examine the intraday variation in spreads, depths, and volumes in a 
pure order-driven market. We partition each trading day into 13 successive 30-minute 
intervals and then calculate the average standardized spread, depth, and volume for each 
stock during each of the 30-minute intervals. The standardized value is obtained by 
subtracting the mean for the day from the value and dividing the difference by the 
standard deviation for the day for the respective stock. Table 1 reports the cross sectional 
mean values for standardized volumes, spreads, and depths for each 30-minute interval of 
the day. 
 
The bid-ask spreads are highest at the beginning of the day, narrows until late morning 
and then increase very slightly during late afternoon. This result confirms the U-shaped 
pattern documented in many studies such as Chan et al (1995), Chung et al (1999) in a 
specialist market. Thus, along with other findings, our result suggests that the U-shaped 
pattern of spreads does not depend on the market architectures. Whether it is an order-
driven market or a specialist market, bid-ask spreads display a U-shaped pattern. Indeed, 
Chung et al (1999) show that even though the market maker sets bid and ask prices in the 
NYSE, the U-shaped intraday pattern of spreads largely reflects the intraday variation in 
spreads established by limit order traders. 
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 Table 1 
This table reports the mean values for the standardized trading volumes, bid-ask spreads and depths of 31 
component stocks in the TSE35 index for each time interval during the day. The standardized variable is 
defined as ( ) σµ−X  where X is the raw variable, µ  is the mean of X  for the day, and σ  is the 
standard deviation of X  for the day. 
Time Standardized 
Volume 
Standardized 
Spread 
Standardized 
Depth 
9:30 – 10:00 -0.031311 0.523855 -0.242232
10:01 – 10:30 0.006585 0.111237 -0.101693
10:31 – 11:00 -0.001707 0.005147 -0.009235
11:01 – 11:30 -0.003119 -0.088074 0.049991
11:31 – 12:00 -0.004632 -0.10714 0.038552
12:01 – 12:30 -0.007843 -0.119627 0.034728
12:31 – 13:00 -0.018975 -0.134378 0.005268
13:01 – 13:30 -0.024468 -0.127337 0.037791
13:31 – 14:00 -0.008385 -0.098485 0.056594
14:01 – 14:30 -0.008157 -0.129938 0.053264
14:31 – 15:00 -0.00025 -0.145834 0.076920
15:01 – 05:30 -0.001182 -0.133749 0.063579
15:31 – 16:00 0.0337 -0.084251 0.111489
 
Trading volume intraday pattern differs from that of spreads. Volume is at the lowest 
when the market opens, increases significantly after half an hour, and then gradually 
decline until early afternoon. It increases for the rest of the day. However, the significant 
rise is in the last half hour of the trading day. Despite that, volume is rather stable relative 
to spread. Our result is different from that of Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1995) in the 
NYSE. Chan et al find that the intraday pattern of volume mimics that of spreads, i.e. U-
shaped pattern. There are a couple of reasons for the lowest volume at the opening. First, 
uncertainty is high at the beginning of the day due to the overnight non-trading period. 
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 Second, trading costs are the highest at the beginning (since spread is widest when the 
market opens). Trading volume rises from early in the afternoon until the market closes. 
 
Depths exhibit a completely different intraday pattern. The market is very thin at the 
open, and then it becomes deeper and deeper in the next one and a half hour. After that it 
is rather stable. This pattern is consistent with information models which predict that the 
market is illiquid at the open (wide spread and low depth) due to high information 
asymmetry which results from the overnight non-trading period. 
 
To formally examine the intraday behavior of bid-ask spreads, depths and volumes we 
use the following models. 
,6655443322110 ii DaDaDaDaDaDaaSTV ε+++++++=  
where  is the  observation of the standardized variable (bid-ask spread, depth or 
volume) of the stock and 
iSTV
thi
61 DD −  are dummy variables.  
11 =D  if the interval is 9:30-10:00, and 0 otherwise; 
12 =D  if the interval is 10:01-10:30, and 0 otherwise; 
13 =D  if the interval is 10:31-11:00, and 0 otherwise; 
14 =D  if the interval is 14:31-15:00, and 0 otherwise; 
15 =D  if the interval is 15:01-15:30, and 0 otherwise; 
16 =D  if the interval is 15:31-16:00, and 0 otherwise. 
0α  measures the average of the standardized variable from 11:01 to 14:30 and 61 αα −  
measure the difference between the mean of the standardized variable in the respective 
interval and the average of the standardized variable from 11:01 to 14:30. 
  
0α  measures the average of the standardized variable from 11:01 to 14:30 and 61 αα −  
measure the difference between the mean of the standardized variable in the respective 
interval and the average of the standardized variable from 11:01 to 14:30. 
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Figure 1: The Intraday Variation in the Standardized Spread. 
We define the standardized spread as ( ) σµ /−S  where  is the quoted spread, S µ  is the mean of quoted 
spread for the day, and σ  is the standard deviation of the quoted spread for the day. 
 
 
We estimate this model for each of 31 stocks using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) with Newey and West (1987) correction for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity. We obtain t-statistics which are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. The results are reported in Table 2. For each dummy variable, we report 
the average coefficient from the regression of each individual stock and also the 
percentage of stocks with positive coefficient. 
 
To test whether each coefficient is significantly greater than zero we use the procedure 
outlined in Meulbroek (1992). Specifically, assume that the individual stock regression t-
statistics asymptotically follow a unit normal distribution, then the Z-statistic to test 
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 whether the mean regression coefficient for each dummy variable is greater than zero is 
given by  
 
Table 2 
This table presents the GMM estimates of the following model for each of the 31 component stocks in the 
TSE-35 index.  
,6655443322110 ii DDDDDDSTV εααααααα +++++++=  
where  is the  observation of the standardized variable (bid-ask spreads, depths or volumes) and 
are dummy variables. 
iSTV
thi
61 DD − 11 =D  if the interval is 9:30-10:00, and 0 otherwise; 12 =D  if the 
interval is 10:01-10:30, and 0 otherwise; 13 =D  if the interval is 10:31-11:00, and 0 otherwise; 14 =D  if 
the interval is 14:31-15:00, and 0 otherwise; 15 =D  if the interval is 15:01-15:30, and 0 otherwise; 
 if the interval is 15:31-16:00, and 0 otherwise. Thus, 16 =D 0α  measures the average of the standardized 
variables from 11:01 to 14:30 and 61 αα −  measure the difference between the mean spread in the 
respective interval and the average spread from 11:01 to 14:30. 
 
 SSpread SVolume SDepth
1D  Average 0.621264 -0.03172 -0.282695
 Positive coefficient (%) 96.77 22.58 9.68
 Z statistic 53.03 -7.6 -28.96
 p-value from Z statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2D  Average 0.217418 0.006175 -0.142156
 Positive coefficient (%) 96.77 45.16 12.9
 Z statistic 20.96 1.548198 -13.7093
 p-value from Z statistic 0.0000 0.060787 0.0000
3D  Average 0.1135 -0.002116 -0.049697
 Positive coefficient (%) 87.1 48.39 32.26
 Z statistic 9.47 -0.301737 -4.41
 p-value from Z statistic 0.0000 0.38142 0.0000
4D  Average -0.038037 -0.000659 0.036457
 Positive coefficient (%) 32.26 58.06 64.52
 Z statistic -4.01 -0.181401 3.05
 p-value from Z statistic 0.9871 0.2357 0.01
5D  Average -0.025375 -0.001591 0.023116
 Positive coefficient (%) 38.71 51.62 61.29
 Z statistic -2.23 -0.720217 2.35
 p-value from Z statistic 0.9871 0.2357 0.01
6D  Average 0.036085 0.033291 0.071026
 Positive coefficient (%) 64.52 83.87 67.74
 Z statistic 3.84 6.14 7.06
 p-value from Z statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Figure 2: The Intraday Variation in the Standardized Volumes 
We define the standardized volume as ( ) σµ /−V , where V  is the volume of trade, µ  is the mean of 
volume for the day, and σ  is the standard deviation of the volume for the day. 
 
 
,1
1
∑
=
=
N
i
itN
Z  
where N is the number of stocks. This test assumes that individual stocks are 
independent. If this assumption does not hold, our econometric specification is not 
perfect.  
 
The results in Table 2 show that the bid-ask spreads are widest at the open, narrow during 
the day, and rise during the last 30-minute interval. During the two intervals before the 
last, the spreads are not significantly greater than the average spread during midday. 
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 Overall, our empirical results are inconsistent with the prediction of Madhavan (1992) in 
which private information is impounded into prices as trading continues; therefore, bid-
ask spreads decline throughout the day. Our results appear consistent with the specialist 
market power models and the inventory models. However, since TSE is a pure order-
driving exchange in which there are no market makers, the monopolistic behavior of 
specialists is not the explanation for the observed intraday patterns of the bid-ask spreads. 
An alternative explanation is that because of increased uncertainty at the open and the 
imminent non-trading period at the close, liquidity providers tend to increase (decrease) 
prices when submitting limit sell (buy) orders. 
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Figure 3: The Intraday Variation in the Standardized Depths 
We define the standardized depth as ( ) σµ /−D , where  is the quoted depth, D µ  is the mean of quoted 
depth for the day, and σ  is the standard deviation of quoted depth for the day. 
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 For transaction volumes, only 1α  is significantly less than zero, and 6α  is significantly 
greater than zero. 52 αα −  are not significantly different from zero. Thus, volumes are 
low during the first half hour at the open, then become stable during the day and rise in 
the last half hour of the trading day. 
  
For market depths at quoted prices, 31 αα −  are significantly less than zero, suggesting 
that the market is thin at the open. Moreover, 321 ααα <<  tells us that the market 
becomes deeper as trading continues. However, the behavior at the end of the trading day 
is not clear. Even though 56 αα >  but 45 αα < . In addition, the percentage of stocks with 
positive coefficients is only 64.52 for 4α , 61.29 for 5α , and 67.74 for 6α . Thus, there is 
no clear evidence that the market depth at the end of the day differs from that at the 
middle of the day. 
 
4. THE RELATION AMONG LIQUIDITY, VOLUME, AND PRICE 
VOLATILITY 
 
4.1. The Theoretical Relation between Liquidity, Volume, and Price Volatility 
  
Harris (1990) defines liquidity as follows. “A market is liquid if traders can buy or sell 
large number of shares when they want and at low transaction costs. Liquidity is the 
willingness of some traders (often but not necessarily dealers) to take the opposite side of 
a trade that is initiated by someone else, at low cost.” This definition implies that spread 
and depth are two dimensions of market liquidity. 
  
Lee Mucklow and Ready (1993), Ye (1995) argue that if the specialist believes that there 
is an increase in the probability of informed trades he would respond by increasing the 
bid-ask spread. Alternatively, he could reduce the depth at the quoted prices. Kavajecz 
(1999) shows that depth is used as a strategic variable by specialists to deal with risks 
associated with information events. Specifically, Kavajecz finds that liquidity providers, 
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 both market maker and limit order traders, reduce depths around earning announcements 
to decrease adverse selection costs. Logically, we can extend the reasoning to the case of 
order-driven market. On the TSE, a complete quote includes the bid and ask prices and 
the market depths which are the number of shares available at each quoted price. All 
liquidity in this exchange is provided by limit orders. If limit order traders believe that 
informed traders have arrived, they may respond by posting lower (higher) bid (ask) 
prices, and/or reducing the depth at each quoted price. This consideration leads us to the 
first hypothesis. 
  
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverse relationship between bid-ask spread and market depth. 
 
Handa and Schwartz (1996) argue that when transaction prices move solely in response 
to information, trading via limit order is suboptimal because investors who place a buy 
(sell) limit order have written a free put (call) option to the market. They show that if the 
price is very volatile, traders submit more limit orders than market orders because the 
expected gains exceed the expected losses from trading against informed traders. 
Foucault (1999) develops a model in which he endogenizes investors' decision to trade 
via limit orders or market orders. He finds that price volatility is a main determinant of 
limit orders. If the price volatility rises, the probability of trading against an informed 
trader increases; therefore, the expected losses to them are larger. To deal with the 
problem, limit order traders have to widen spreads by increasing (decreasing) ask (bid) 
prices and/or to reduce the quantity offered (demanded) at each quoted price. Moreover, 
in this case, choosing market order is even a worse strategy because it is more likely that 
the order is executed at a poor price when the price volatility increases. Those 
considerations lead us to the second hypothesis. 
  
Hypothesis 2: There is an inverse relationship between price volatility and market 
liquidity.  
 15
  
In Easley and O'Hara (1992) volume is a main determinant of spread. In particular, the 
spread exists because of the possibility of trading against informed traders. High trading 
volume is considered as an indication of the advent of informed traders. Initially, the 
market maker sets the spread based on the ex ante probability of informed trades and then 
increases (decreases) it if there is an abnormally high (low) volume of trade. Thus, this 
model predicts that high volume is accompanied by wide spread. The model does not 
consider market depth since a unit trade size is assumed. However, a logical extension of 
the model is that depth would decrease with volume. In addition, because the volume is 
positively related to the number of transactions, we will therefore have to control for the 
impact of the number of transaction in our empirical analysis. Although the model is 
developed in the context of a specialist market, we conjecture that the results also apply 
to a pure order-driven market. Those considerations lead us to the third hypothesis. 
  
Hypothesis 3: There is an inverse relationship between volume and market liquidity. 
  
4.2. Empirical Methodology 
 
4.2.1. Time Interval  
 
Each trading day commences at 9:30 and ends at 16:00 and will be partitioned into 13 
half hour intervals. Since intraday observations are separated by overnight and weekend 
periods, the time series are not uniform in terms of interval length. 
  
4.2.2. Price Volatility 
  
The price volatility in interval t is computed as 
,
1
2
,∑ == Nj tjRVOLATI  where 1
,1
,
, −=
− tj
tj
tj P
P
R . 
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 Thus, is the return of the  transaction in the time interval t  and  is the total 
number of transactions in interval t . Traditionally, the price volatility is calculated by 
tjR ,
thj N
( 2
1 ,
1 ∑ = −Nj tj RR )N . In this paper, we assume that the mean return R  in each interval is 
equal to zero and thus, we do not subtract it from . This is a reasonable assumption 
given the fact that the interval is short (half hour). In addition, in computing the price 
volatility, we do not divide the sum of squared returns by the number of transaction since 
we would like to measure the cumulative price fluctuation rather than the average price 
fluctuation for each transaction. 
tjR ,
  
4.2.2. Spread, Market Depth, and Volume 
  
Spread is defined as the difference between the ask price and the bid price. Market depth 
is measured by the total number of shares posted at the quoted prices.  
,askt
bid
tt DEPTHDEPTHDEPTH +=  
where and are the number of shares posted at the bid price and ask 
price respectively. Volume variable is measured by the total number of shares traded in 
interval t. 
bid
tDEPTH
ask
tDEPTH
  
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
  
5.1. The Relation between Spreads and Depths 
  
To examine the relation between spreads and depths, we estimate the following 
regression for each stock.  
,
11
1
,1210 t
i
tiittt uTIMESDEPTHaSSPRDaaSDEPTH ++++= ∑
=
− θ  
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   is the standardized spread in interval t ,  is the standardized depth at 
the end of interval t , and  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
tSSPRD tSDEPTH
tiTIME , ti =  
and 0 otherwise,  is the error term. We include  and on the right 
hand side of the equation  in order to control for the intra-day variation and 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable. Even though there are 13 time intervals every 
day, there are only 12 observations since  is used as an explanatory variable. 
Moreover, to avoid multicollinearity we do not assign a dummy variable to one interval. 
Thus, we only have 11 dummy variables. 
tu tiTIME , 1−tSDEPTH
1−tSDEPTH
  
We estimate this model for each stock using the GMM with the Newey and West (1987) 
correction. We obtain t statistics that are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
As in the last section, to test whether each coefficient significantly differs from zero we 
use the procedure outlined in Meulbroek (1992). The regression results are reported in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3  
This table reports the GMM estimates of the following regression model for each of 31 component stocks 
in the TSE-35 index. 
,
11
1
,1210 t
i
tiittt uTIMESDEPTHaSSPRDaaSDEPTH ++++= ∑
=
− θ  
where  is the standardized spread in interval t ,  is the standardized depth at the end of 
interval t , and  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
tSPRD tSDEPTH
tiTIME , ti =  and 0 otherwise,  is the 
error term. 
tu
 
 1a 2a
Average coefficient -2.9232 0.2592
Negative coefficients (%) 74.19 0
Z-statistic -2.54 22.4938
p-value 0.0017 0.0000
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 We find that the depth is significantly and negatively related to the spread. This result is 
consistent with hypothesis 1 and supports the view that limit order traders use both bid-
ask spread and depth as means to respond to any indication that the probability of 
informed trades has risen. 
  
5.2. The Impacts of Price Volatility, Trading Activity, and Transaction Volume on 
Market Liquidity 
  
To investigate the impacts of price volatility, transaction volume, and trading activity on 
market liquidity, we estimate the following linear models for each stock.  
∑
=
−− ++++++=
11
1
11,11111 ,
i
tttiitttt SSPRDTIMESVOLUMENTVOLATISSPRD εϕθδγβα
,12
11
1
,22122 tt
i
tiitttt uSDEPTHTIMESVOLUMENTVOLATISDEPTH ++++++= −
=
− ∑ ϕθδγβα
where  is the standardized spread in time interval ,  is the 
standardized market depth at the end of time interval t ,  is the volatility during 
time interval ,  is the number of transactions during time interval t ,  
is the standardized volume during time interval t , and  is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if and 0 otherwise. The inclusion of and  on the 
right hand side of the first equation and  and on the right hand side of 
the second equation is to control for the intra-day variation and autocorrelation in the 
dependent variables. 
tSSPRD t tSDEPTH
1−tVOLATI
1−t tNT tSVOLUME
tiTIME ,
ti = tiTIME , 1−tSPRD
tiTIME , 1−tSDEPTH
  
The results are reported in Table 4. For brevity, the estimates of iθ  are not reported here. 
However, these coefficients are significantly different from zero, indicating that it is 
necessary to control for the intra-day effects. 
  
Theoretically, there are 2 effects of the number of transactions on market liquidity. On 
one hand, transactions consume the liquidity available in the market and therefore there 
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 should be an inverse relationship between market liquidity and the number of trades. In 
other words, spread (depth) should be positively (negatively) related to the number of 
trades. On the other hand, higher trading activities may capture market interest and 
induce investors to supply more liquidity to the market as shown in Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988) and thus, there is a negative (positive) relationship between spread 
(depth) and the number of trades. Our empirical results show that the first effect 
dominates the second one. Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001) also find that there is a negative 
relationship between depth and number of transaction in the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong. 
  
We find that the price volatility is positively (negatively) related to spread (depth). This 
result is consistent with the predictions of Handa and Schwartz (1996), and Foucault 
(1999) and therefore supports our hypothesis 2. Indeed, if the price is very volatile, the 
probability that a limit order is executed is higher even though bid - ask spread is wide. 
As a result, investors tend to submit limit orders with lower bid prices and higher ask 
prices. This leads to higher bid-ask spread and lower depth at the best quote. 
  
The relationship between volume and spread is more complex. We find that there is a 
negative relationship between spread and volume and there is a positive relationship 
between depth and volume. In other words, volume is directly related to market liquidity. 
This result is inconsistent with the predictions of Easley and O'Hara (1992) and therefore 
does not support our hypothesis 3. However, this can be explained by the model of Harris 
and Raviv (1993). Harris and Raviv assume that traders share prior beliefs and receive 
common information but differ in the way they interpret the information. Thus, high 
volume could mean high liquidity trades and as a result spread should decrease and depth 
should increase. Those establish the direct relationship between volume and market 
liquidity. 
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 Table 4 
This table presents the GMM estimates of the following regression models for each of 31 component stocks 
in the TSE-35 index.  
∑
=
−− ++++++=
11
1
11,11111 ,
i
tttiitttt SSPRDTIMESVOLUMENTVOLATISSPRD εϕθδγβα
,12
11
1
,22122 tt
i
tiitttt uSDEPTHTIMESVOLUMENTVOLATISDEPTH ++++++= −
=
− ∑ ϕθδγβα whe
re  is the standardized spread in time interval t ,  is the standardized market depth at 
the end of time interval t ,  is the volatility during time interval ,  is the number of 
transactions during time interval t ,  is the standardized volume during time interval t , and 
 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
tSSPRD tSDEPTH
1−tVOLATI 1−t tNT
tSVOLUME
tiTIME , ti =  and 0 otherwise. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable is standardized spread 
 1β 1γ 1δ  1ϕ
Average coefficient 0.192 0.0052 -0.111 0.1742
Positive coefficient (%) 64.52 77.42 32.26 100
Z-statistic 2.6923 4.5512 -2.5683 18.2461
p-value 0.0035 0.0000 0.0051 0.0000
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is standardized depth 
 2β 2γ 2δ  2ϕ
Average coefficient -0.1893 -0.00028 0.02921 0.252
Positive coefficient (%) 67.74 64.52 19.35 0
Z-statistic -3.303 -1.227 3.856 21.488
p-value 0.0005 0.11 0.000 0.0000
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  
This paper examines the intraday behavior of the market liquidity in the Toronto Stock 
Exchange which uses a computerized limit order trading system. Along with previous 
studies, we confirm that the U-shaped intraday pattern of spread does not depend on the 
market architecture. Whether the exchange is order-driven, specialist, hybrid, or 
 21
 dealership, spread still displays a U-shaped intraday pattern. In addition, we show that the 
market is very thin at the opening but it becomes deeper and deeper as trades go on. After 
one and a half hours, it becomes stable. Our results also indicate that the volume of trade 
is low in the first half hour of the day and then stable until the last half hour when it rises. 
  
Consistent with Harris (1990), our results show that limit order traders use both spread 
and depth to protect themselves from informed traders. If they believe that the probability 
that some traders possess superior information has increased, they would respond by 
widening spread and/or decreasing the depth at each quoted price. We find evidence that 
spread and depth are negatively correlated. Thus, as indicated by Harris (1990) and Lee, 
Mucklow and Ready (1993), spread and depth are two dimensions of market liquidity. 
  
We find that price volatility is inversely related to market liquidity. When the price 
volatility increases, the probability of being bagged by informed traders also increases. 
Limit order traders have to post higher (lower) ask (bid) price and/or reduce the depth at 
each quote. This establishes the inverse relationship. 
  
Finally, we show that there is a direct relationship between trading volume and liquidity. 
Harris and Raviv (1993) explain this result by postulating that traders receive the same 
information but they interpret the information in different ways. Thus, it could be the case 
that high volume implies high liquidity trade which leads to the increase in market 
liquidity. 
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 APPENDIX 
Below are the names and the corresponding tick symbols of the 31 firms in the dataset 
  
Symbol Company Name 
 
A ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC. 
AL ALCAN INC. 
BMO BANK OF MONTREAL 
BNS BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA 
ABX BARRICK GOLD CORPORATION 
BCE BCE INC. 
BVF BIOVAIL CORPORATION 
BBD.B BOMBARDIER INC. 
CM CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE 
CNR CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAY CO. 
CP CANADIAN PACIFIC 
CTR.A CANADIAN TIRE CORP. 
CLS CELESTICA INC. 
DFS DOFASCO INC. 
MG.A MAGNA INTERNATIONAL INC. 
N INCO LIMITED 
NA NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA 
NCX NOVA CHEMICALS CORPORATION 
NT NORTEL NETWORKS 
PCA PETRO-CANADA 
PDG PLACER DOME INC. 
RIM RESEARCH IN MOTION LIMITED 
RY ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 
SJR.B SHAW COMMUNICATIONS INC. 
SU SUNCOR ENERGY INC. 
TA TRANSALTA CORPORATION 
TD TORONTO-DOMINION BANK 
TEK.B TECK COMINCO LIMITED 
TLM TALISMAN ENERGY INC. 
TOC THOMSON CORPORATION 
TRP TRANSCANADA PIPELINES LTD. 
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